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This paper, which considers the income maintenance experiments
from a welfare administrator’s point of view, explores two major ques-
tions. The first is one of process: What is the relationship between the
way in which the experiments were conducted and their reception by
welfare officials? The second question concerns substance: What lessons
for administering today’s welfare system are suggested by the goals
with which the experiments were undertaken and by the knowledge
they generated?
Before addressing these questions, however, it may be helpful to
briefly set them in the context of the major papers before this con-
ference. A review of the papers by Burtless, Cain and Hanushek
highlights the diversity of environments studied in the negative income
tax experiments -- variations in the demographics of the sites, in their
grant levels, their economic conditions and their tax structures -- a
diversity that mirrors the heterogeneous circumstances of the poor in
this country. Such diversity heightens the difficulty of any effort to
reform the nation’s income maintenance system. Moreover, the varia-
tion of environments studied was compounded by the wide variation of
experimental designs, which encompassed so many different benefit
and tax levels, research samples and services. Thus, in reflecting on how
these experiments might have affected welfare administrators in the
past and how their lessons might illuminate lessons for the future, it is
useful at the outset to recognize that these experiments were ambitious,
highly complicated and probably overly elaborate in design. While this
paper does not focus directly on these characteristics, it will have occa-
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sion to touch on the question of their implications for welfare adminis-
trators and welfare reform.
The Conduct of the Evaluations
At the beginning of my own tenure as New York State Commis-
sioner of Social Services in 19~77, research on the income maintenance
experiments was drawing to a close. Over my five years in that position I
was only very generally aware of the negative income tax experiments.
Extended discussion of the study, either within my own department or
among my colleagues in other states, did not occur. My relationship to
the experiments seems to have been typical of that of most welfare
officials, both at this stage of the evaluation and earlier. A scan of the
1968-78 issues of Public Welfare, the major journal for administrators
published by the American Public Welfare Association, suggests that
this premise is correct.
In a 1974 article on "The Current Status of Human Services," Mitch-
ell Ginsberg and Norman Lourie referred to the New Jersey experiment
along with other research on the welfare system as evidence that
transfer payments have "little or no effect on the willingness to work
and work incentives" but also cautioned that "it would be naive to
assume that basic public policy decisions will be made primarily or even
substantially on the basis of research findings.’’1 Other issues of the
journal published over this 10-year period contained a half dozen addi-
tional brief discussions of the concept of the negative income tax, mostly
raised in connection with the proposed legislation on the Family Assis-
tance Plan, but no comment on the negative income tax experiments
themselves is apparent.
Did the negative income tax develop a higher profile among welfare
administrators in the communities where research was conducted?
Because this question was not of primary interest to almost anyone who
followed the experiments, it is difficult to piece together the answer.
There is, however, some evidence that speaks to this relationship.
In New Jersey, there was no official connection between the state
and the experiment. Contact between welfare officials and researchers at
that site was apparently limited to a controversy over whether research-
ers were obliged to release their records to the welfare department so
that officials there could determine if some individuals were collecting
payments under both programs.2
To prevent a recurrence of such a conflict, the relevant states were
officially a party to the experiments in both Gary and Seattle-Denver. As
Director of the Office of Income Maintenance Experiments in the State of
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to work closely with welfare officials on tracking clients to be certain that
they were not receiving payments from both aid to families with
dependent children (AFDC) and the experiment. Also, some officials in-
dicated that something could be learned from the administrative innova-
tions of the experiments. However, administrators seemed to be only
mildly interested in the possibility that a negative income tax might
replace the welfare system as they knew it; the attitude seems to have
been that by and large academic research would have little effect on pro-
grams in the real world.
In Gary, Indiana the experiment -- in the words of its research direc-
tor, Kenneth Kehrer -- "in effect set up its own welfare system," taking
over the administration of the cases of participants who entered the
negative income tax experiment as recipients of AFDC benefits or food
stamps03 Because the caseworkers for these individuals were employees
of the county welfare department working under subcontract, there was
by definition a close connection between the experiment and the depart-
ment. As in Seattle, however, involvement of welfare workers and of-
ficials was largely limited to the "’nuts and bolts" administrative issues.
For at least two reasons, it is not surprising that except for the
aspects of the experiments that directly concerned them, welfare offi-
cials were generally out of touch with the progress and development of
the evaluation. First, like almost all long-term research, the negative
income tax experiments operated within a different time frame than the
one to which administrators and elected officials must usually respond.
The experiments were expected to take a number of years to produce
answers about how to improve the nation’s income maintenance
system. Meanwhile, the system itself was changing. In the turbulent
10-year period between the late 1960s and 1970s, welfare administrators
confronted a variety of new and pressing issues -- the separation of ser-
vices from income maintenance functions within the AFDC program;
the need to relate to many new programs including Medicaid, sup-
plemental security income (SSI), Title XX and a greatly expanded food
stamp program; and demands that more attention be devoted to error
rates and to work obligations for welfare recipients. Given the pressures
to adapt to these changed circumstances, it is understandable that ad-
ministrators did not focus on the fine points of an experiment that they
perceived as offering few solutions to immediate problems.
In connection with the subject of different time frames, it should be
borne in mind that by definition an extended research project outlives
the terms of office of most political leaders and officials. In New York
State, for example, the period of the negative income tax research
covered the terms of three governors and five welfare commissioners.
This natural rate of turnover means that officials within a political
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attention to the unfolding of long-term research.
The difference between the time perspectives of administrators and
researchers is apt to create obstacles to sustained communication be-
tween the two groups in almost any long-term evaluation. A second
reason for the existence of such a gulf in the case of the negative income
tax research is more specific to these particular experiments and the
questions they asked.
The experiments were designed to determine whether it was possi-
ble to replace existing programs with a radically new and improved in-
come maintenance system. With this approach to reform, the researchers
had little incentive to establish regular channels of communication --
except for those they specifically needed to do their work m with welfare
administrators. Had the experimental results been strikingly positive
and subsequently translated into policy, these administrators would
have been called upon to function in a very changed system -- or, more
likely, they would have been displaced. To the extent that the researchers
expected such an outcome, they may well have concluded that there
was little to gain from interchange with officials of the existing pro-
grams.
The vision that led the designers of the negative income tax experi-
ments to develop a new program model was that of an income
maintenance system that was more uniform, rational, and fair and less
intrusive. The experiments provide only limited information about what
might have been achieved with a permanent negative income tax. We do
know, however, that despite the numerous changes that have taken
place since the inception of the experiments, the current system still falls
far short of the ideals that inspired them. The problems in the cur-
rent AFDC program suggest that policymakers interested in replacing it
with a negative income tax had ample justification for examining the
possibilities of wholesale reform. Nevertheless, there are trade-offs in-
volved in trying to build a new system from the ground up -- or even
just in testing an innovation outside of the system where it must
ultimately operate -- as opposed to pursuing change within an existing
institution.
Two examples from the work of the Manpower Demonstration
Research Corporation (MDRC) may help to illustrate the point. MDRC
was formed in 1974 by a consortium of federal agencies to evaluate the
National Supported Work Demonstration, a structured work experience
program for hard-to-employ individuals. At the end of a five-year
research period, the program was found to be most effective in improv-
ing the employment prospects of long-term welfare recipients.4 How-
ever, with its local projects either developed specifically for the demon-
stration or operated by social service agencies in the community, the
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Over the years since the experiments were completed, policymakers
have expressed considerable interest in the Supported Work results,
and the strategy has been subsequently tried in scattered locations
around the country. However, there has been no widespread adaptation
of the technique for use with the welfare population. Undoubtedly this
is largely because in an era of fiscal restraint, this program, even though
ultimately cost-effective, requires a relatively large upfront social invest-
ment. Nevertheless, it may be that the demonstration’s institutional
distance from the welfare system further decreased the likelihood that
Supported Work would be widely used within that system.
In 1982 MDRC undertook another evaluation centering on employ-
ment for welfare recipients, the National Demonstration of State
Work/Welfare Initiatives, which is now just past its midpoint. The
Demonstration is examining programs for welfare recipients in 11 states
that, in response to the new flexibility offered them under the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, have chosen to develop their own
strategies for alleviating welfare dependency -- centering on job search
and unpaid work experience with some education and training. In con-
trast to the Supported Work demonstration, the Work/Welfare project
consists of a series of self-contained tests, each with its own schedule,
but from which the researchers draw general conclusions. Thus, in a
practice that might have been useful for the income maintenance
studies, cross-site analysis has been built into this evaluation from the
outset.
The Work/Welfare Demonstration has been intentionally operated
with ties to the welfare system. For example, in addition to keeping state
and local welfare officials from all states in the demonstration abreast of
the findings on their own programs as they emerge, MDRC has
periodically brought them together to exchange views and insights
about their programs and to discuss the broader implications of the find-
ings. In another undertaking that might have benefited the negative
income tax experiments, the interim demonstration findings have been
communicated to these officials and to others, particularly elected offi-
cials, in a brief and relatively nontechnical summary document,s
Welfare officials in participating states have cooperated in protecting the
integrity of random assignment and have otherwise facilitated the pro-
gress of the research. Administrators, governors, legislators and con-
gressional representatives have evinced a sustained, and often keen, in-
terest in the findings, and generally seem to have grown in their
understanding of the contribution that experimental research can make
to their programs.
One very important facet of the demonstration is that the individual
programs under study have been developed by the states themselves,
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and weaknesses of the new model. This decentralized approach to the
formulation of research questions differs from the practice in many
experiments, where the program model is first developed by an outside
authority, and then state or local departments or agencies are invited to
take part in a test of its effectiveness. For example, Kenneth Kehrer
recalls that in the early 1970s the State of Indiana approached the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare with a proposal to test a
social services voucher plan, and that the Department instead prevailed
upon the state to accept the income maintenance study that ultimately
became the Gary negative income tax experiment.
Given the ties between the Work/Welfare Demonstration and its
participating states, there is likely to be a more direct and clear line of
influence from its major findings to welfare programs than was the case
for Supported Work, and certainly for the income maintenance experi-
ments. Even at this point in the evaluation, states are already shaping
and refining their programs in terms of what they have learned from the
research.
This does not mean, of course, that the Work/Welfare model of
fielding an experiment is the only appropriate one. One of the reasons
that the Work/Welfare states and their welfare agencies have been as
susceptible to influence as they have is that the innovations tested in the
Demonstration -- the imposition on recipients of largely mandatory
work-related obligations such as job search and workfare -- are changes
that can be accommodated without a major overhaul of the current
system. They are also policies that states can hope to pursue even with
the limited resources currently available to them for social program-
ming.
There may also be -- as seems to have been the case at the outset of
the negative income tax experiments -- good reason to study more
sweeping proposals for reform. However, those who undertake such
research should recognize that one disadvantage of a less incremental
approach is that it is much more difficult to work closely with officials in
the current system to jointly identfy and introduce the changes sug-
gested by research results.
Notwithstanding the many forces that kept administrators and other
officials from becoming more closely involved in framing the negative
income tax research questions or exploring the results as they emerged,
it is instructive to speculate briefly on what might have transpired f this
had occurred. One cannot know, but it seems probable that as the
research took shape and progressed, these officials might have wanted
to probe more closely into some of the intriguing questions that remain
even today when we review the results. They might have, for example,
focused on the concept that Burtless refers to -- in the somewhat other-
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They might have asked if the "leisure" could be an opportunity for a
single parent to make a modest reduction in work or earnings that
could, in turn, have a positive impact on his or her children’s school
attendance and performance. They might have asked more about the
interrelationships between the "nonlabor" aspects of the experiments
discussed in Erik Hanushek’s paper.7 They might have tried to push
hard against the findings on marital stability and family composition to
find out whether these results really could offer guidance on the design
of income maintenance programs, or if they were too limited to do so.
Would such attention and questioning from people involved in the
real-world programs and policies have produced better answers?
Perhaps no. Non-researchers can be impatient and unforgiving about
the difficulties of using data to speak to complicated policy issues, and
the three major papers presented to this conference attest to the many
difficulties of this nature that arose in the income maintenance experi-
ments. Still, one cannot help but wonder if over the decade in which the
negative income tax was studied, a steady infusion of such interest
would have given these questions a little more urgency, moving them
closer to the center of public awareness. Citizens and politicians might
have concluded that if these concerns could not be addressed by a
negative income tax, they at least deserved more attention. In brief, we
cannot be certain what cross-fertilization of research with the interests of
public officials would have yielded. Perhaps the results would have
been only interference, but perhaps they would have brought forth a
process whereby issues posed in the experiments found their way more
rapidly into public discourse.
Administrative Lessons from the Experiments
While it is true that the major findings from the negative income tax
experiments had little or no direct impact on the welfare system, there
was an unanticipated spillover from another aspect of these studies. In
light of the fact that the association between researchers and welfare of-
ficials centered on administrative matters, it is perhaps not surprising it
was in the area of program procedures that the negative income tax
experiments left their strongest mark on the system.
To gather information on the income and employment status of par-
ticipants, the experiments developed practices that differed in three
important ways from those in effect at most welfare offices during this
period. First, rather than an infrequent face-to-face redetermination,
participants were generally required to report on these matters on a
monthly basis by completing and mailing in a form. Second, these data
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retrospective budgeting, the biweekly benefits sent to a family were
based on their circumstances for the previous month, not on what it was
anticipated they would need for the next one.
The reaction to these innovations was generally positive. In New
Jersey, researchers first found that their reporting forms posed a number
of problems, but a year after families began using redesigned forms, the
number of filing problems to be handled by the experiment’s office had
dropped from 25 percent to 8 percent per reporting period.8 On the
basis of a series of comparisons between reports to the payments office
and other sources of information in rural experiments, researchers con-
cluded that although self-employed farmers did not perform as well as
wage earners, "virtually all families were able to comply with the report-
ing requirements and to report information with a high degree of ac-
curacy, lending strong support to the cost-saving administrative pro-
cedure of self-reporting by participants in welfare-type programs.’’9
Although Kenneth Kehrer believes that there was relatively little
sustained interest in the monthly reporting and retrospective budgeting
practices in Gary on the part of Indiana welfare officials, both he and
Joseph Bell report that the innovations were influential in Colorado. Fur-
thermore, as the experiments progressed, researchers began to ask if
these techniques would not be profitably applied to the AFDC program.
Based on results of her 1973 simulation study of the effects of a variety of
retrospective budgeting approaches, Jodie Allen concluded that they
could be.1° Her work prompted the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (and later, Health and Human Services) to undertake a
series of demonstrations that studied the effects of a monthly reporting
and retrospective budgeting program.
Findings from the first year of the earliest of these studies, con-
ducted in Colorado, were instrumental in the enactment of the Reagan
administration’s 1981 budget proposal that mandated both practices
nationwide for the AFDC and food stamp programs.ll Of course, as is
often the case when research results lead to a policy change, the findings
were in accord with a prevailing sentiment, which had grown through-
out the 1970s, that the welfare system should reduce its error rates and
exercise firmer control over its disbursement of benefits.
Today, however, the verdict is still out on the ultimate usefulness of
monthly reporting and retrospective budgeting. In contrast to the first-
year findings on the Colorado program, results from the second year,
which did not become widely available until after the 1981 federal man-
date, showed that these innovations, rather than saving the state
money, actually entailed a slight cost.
Apparently this reversal was a result of modifications in the conven-
tional system to which the experimental practices were compared. Dur-
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system were often conducted late and by mail, rather than face to face.
In the second year, following a number of procedural reforms, Colorado
had begun to institute timely face-to-face redeterminations.12
A broader summary of results from evaluations of monthly report-
ing and retrospective budgeting in five locations, including Colorado, is
in keeping with these findings. The report, issued by Abt Associates
Inc., concludes that monthly reporting produced savings larger than
those under a conventional system that does not provide for face-to-face
redeterminations but was no more effective than a system that uses such
redeterminations.13 Also, on the basis of data from the first year of the
Colorado demonstration and from an Illinois demonstration, this same
report found that "in practice, the differences between retrospective
and prospective accounting in the demonstrations proved to be few and
to affect a relatively small number of situations.’’14
What about the effects on recipients? Here, again, answers are
mixed. Abt Associates concluded that neither monthly reporting nor
retrospective budgeting caused particular problems for recipients. In
Michigan and Massachusetts, the percentage of case closures due to
failure to file monthly reports was similar to "analogous closures" for
failure to appear for redetermination under the conventional system.
Furthermore, interviews of people from closed cases in Illinois and
Michigan, contacted from one to six months after closure, uncovered no
significant differences in the value of AFDC benefits not paid to those
who have been terminated under the monthly reporting and the con-
ventional systems. Also in those states, a comparison of clients’ circum-
stances in a given month to payments they received in the same month
showed no significant differences in the extent to which the conven-
tional and monthly reporting systems created lags in grant adjustment.15
Citing different data, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities is
less sanguine about the impact of monthly reporting on recipients. In a
study of 883 AFDC households terminated in the Denver monthly re-
porting experiment in 1979 and late 1980 for failure to file a monthly
report, Mathematica Policy Research estimated that between 20 and 50
percent of the households terminated for failure to file or failure to cor-
rect were actually eligible at the time of the termination. Another study
conducted by the Michigan Department of Social Services found that
more than nine out of ten recipients whose benefits had been terminated
for failure to comply with the monthly reporting requirement were
otherwise eligible for assistance when their cases were closed.16
Several observations can be made about these studies and the dif-
ferent directions in which they seem to point. John Bickerman, the co-
author of the analysis of monthly reporting issued by the Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, points out that unlike the Mathematica and
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cases under either system were closed in error. Also it does not show
whether there was any difference between the number of families
wrongfully terminated under each system. Bickerman also cites several
factors that he believes would make monthly reporting more prone to
error than less frequent face-to-face redetermination: the possibility of
slip-ups in data processing, the potential problems associated with mail-
ing forms, and the very frequency with which data are processed -- the
hypothesis being that information handled six times in six months
rather than once every six months is more likely to be tainted with error
just because it is transmitted more frequently.
In the face of the mixed evidence, it is somewhat difficult to know
how to assess the retrospective requirement. In all likelihood, however,
the presumption should be against heavy reliance on a system if there is
a possibility that it can harm clients and little proof that it is superior to
other methods. Concluding from the research findings that monthly
reporting seems most useful when applied to cases where information
would otherwise be missed, Bickerman and Greenstein recommend that
states identify the categories of cases likely to be most troublesome to
verify and target monthly reporting only to them.17
Interestingly, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 reversed in part the
1981 provisions on monthly reporting and retrospective budgeting,
allowing states to cease these practices for all clients except those with
earned income or a recent work history. This scaling down of the 1981
policy was apparently a response to a number of state officials who had
objected to the changes.18 However, according to the Office of Family
Assistance, since the blanket mandate has been lifted only a handful of
states have availed themselves of the opportunity to return to their
previous methods of doing business. (The former Director of Govern-
mental Affairs and Social Policy of the American Public Welfare Associa-
tion believes that among states that have done so, concern for client
welfare was probably the primary consideration.)
It is possible that most states have maintained monthly reporting
and retrospective budgeting because, having become accustomed to
these systems, they now have found that they can operate them fairly
and that they do improve efficiency. In an informal discussion among
administrators at a recent conference of the National Council of State
Human Service Administrators of the American Public Welfare Associa-
tion, a number of commissioners said they had found these systems
useful.
It is also possible that some states have continued these practices
simply because the momentum of the situation encourages them to do
so; once the systems are in place, it may be easier to assume that they
serve a useful function than it is to carry out a thorough review of what
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answered questions about monthly reporting and retrospective budget-
ing over a decade after they were studied underscores the challenge of
initiating and assessing even modest administrative changes in a large
and complex income maintenance system.
While retrospective budgeting and monthly reporting were the
administrative aspects of the negative income tax experiments with the
most direct carryover into the welfare system, the experiments did raise
other administrative issues that are of interest to welfare officials. One
important question is the extent to which participating families were
actually aware of the rules of the game. Periodic surveys of families
participating in the rural experiments showed that rules concerning
"the basic benefit level, the implicit tax rate, and the breakeven rate
were understood by only about one-half of the families and that their
understanding did not improve during the experiment .... More than
one-quarter of the families thought that the program’s tax on their in-
come (which in fact ranged from 30 to 70 percent) was either zero or 100
percent.’’19 Results of a survey administered to families after their first
year in the Seattle-Denver income maintenance experiments showed
that the mean percentage of correct answers for understanding the
calculation of grant payments was 38 percent in Seattle and 46 percent in
Denver. 2o
It is likely, as the analysts of this survey put it, that "average com-
prehension scores understate behaviorally related knowledge’’21 -- in
other words, that people are better able to act in accordance with rules
than to answer questions about them on written tests. Nevertheless,
these results raise a troubling question -- namely, at what point policy-
makers defeat the purposes of the incentives they create by rendering
them so complex that rewards and penalties are obscured. To cite just
one contemporary example of this dilemma: How many AFDC recipi-
ents will choose to work or cease working on the basis of the rules for
Medicaid eligibility for income earners that have been constructed and
reconstructed over the past several years? A reasonable hypothesis
would be that very few individuals have acted in terms of these exqui-
sitely graded incentive structures.
Still another interesting question embedded in the negative income
tax experiments is the extent to which an income maintenance system
ought to be impersonal. In contrast to the welfare system, wrote David
Kershaw and Jerilyn Fair, the New Jersey negative income tax experi-
ment "was explicitly designed to minimize personal and face-to-face
contact between participants and staff members.’’22 Thus, when the
New Jersey payments office ran into difficulties about a family’s pay-
ment forms or benefits, field staff, who were responsible for relation-
ships with the families, contacted them first with a form letter, then with
a telephone call and next with a handwritten note. Home visits were a
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Although these practices represent a significant change from the
model of heavy caseworker involvement in the affairs of a client family,
the negative income tax experiments did not always succeed in making
such a clean break with the conventional system. In the Gary experi-
ments, for example, Kenneth Kehrer points out that for several reasons,
many families actually had much more contact with professionals than
was the case before they joined the experiment. First, some families in
the experiment were offered support services -- as families were in Seattle
and Denver. Second, AFDC families in Gary were subject to the month-
ly reporting procedures of the experiment and to the usual AFDC six-
month face-to-face recertifications. (Families on food stamps also under-
went recertifications.) Finally, as in all the experiments, Gary families
were interviewed by researchers, and often did not draw a distinction
between the roles of these individuals and those of officials in an income
maintenance system.
It is not even clear, moreover, that all of the experiments placed as
high a priority on impersonality as New Jersey’s did. Christopherson
describes a system in Seattle and Denver whereby staff in local field
offices contacted families about payment issues primarily by telephone,
with occasional home visits, reserving mail only for routine information.
As a result of contact, he reports, field workers often developed a
family advocate role in disagreements with the payments department.
Christopherson characterizes this relationship as a "productive" one,
because field staff "understood the positions of both sides and could
thereby best articulate the positions of each to the other.’’24
In all, this experience underscores an insight that often emerges
from social policy experiments -- that it is easier to decide in the abstract
to keep a distance from participants and their concerns than it is to carry
through on that resolution. Nonetheless, the question remains: How-
ever much the negative income tax experiments succeeded or did not
succeed in developing a more impersonal income maintenance system,
is such a goal a desirable one?
Adding further significance to this question is the way in which the
effort to maintain impersonality is consistent with an important change
in the AFDC program during the 1970s -- the separation of income
maintenance from social service functions. The driving force behind this
reform was philosophic but budgetary aspects were important: by
assigning income maintenance functions to workers who commanded
relatively low wages, the program could concentrate limited dollars for
social services on salaries for a smaller number of professionals. It was
argued that the separation would allow social workers to devote their
full energies to assisting clients. Still, an important point made in
debates over this modification echoed the thesis of the negative income
tax -- that income maintenance should be a less meddlesome, client-A PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR’S VIEW 239
involved system, that the bureaucrat who decides what benefits are due
a client should not be peering over that person’s shoulder.
In many ways, this is an appealing argument, and in one respect it
seems even more cogent today than it was when the income main~
tenance experiments were first designed. Since that time, we have ac-
quired a clearer vision of the nature of the welfare caseload. The recent
work of Mary Jo Bane and David Ellwood on caseload dynamics dispels
the notion of the typical welfare recipient as a person sunk into
dependency.2s Most recipients, we know, leave welfare rather rapidly
-- and in all probability many in this group do not require massive or
intensive special assistance delivered through the welfare system. Tem-
porary income support and modest help with finding child care or with
conducting a job search may be all that is required.
But Bane and Ellwood also alert us to the existence of a significant
number of people in the caseloads -- the long-term recipients who con-
sume a disproportionate share of the nation’s welfare dollars. Six out of
ten people who do not leave the rolls at the end of two years, their study
shows, are likely to be there at the end of six.
These chronic recipients are likely to need more intensive social
services than many short-stayers. And when the system does encounter
this level of need, it seems dysfunctional to assign clients with multiple
disadvantages to an income maintenance worker who knows nothing
about the complex set of problems that may well be contributing to their
dependency. What seems to make more sense is a case management
approach, with. one professional asked to become familiar with all the
relevant circumstances, both financial and social service, that pertain to
a person’s stay on welfare. In this situation, the effort not to become in-
trusive is considerably less compelling than the need to deliver services
in a coherent manner.
Conclusions
Today, as reformers of all political persuasions appear poised to
make another attempt to improve a welfare system that pleases almost
no one, can they look to the negative income tax experience for
guidance? In one respect, they should do so. Especially for the many
recipients who use welfare as a temporary source of aid, the goal of a
simplified approach to income maintenance merits serious attention. At
the same time, the design of the experiments may serve to remind con-
temporary reformers that it is easier to espouse such an ideal than it is to
translate it into policy.
The overall thrust of the negative income tax effort may be less rele-
vant to the plight of chronic recipients. While two of the experiments did240 Barbara B. Blum
make a bow in the direction of support services, this was not their main
focus. Yet today, it appears that a priority for AFDC recipients with
multiple and long-term disadvantages is not only to offer them income
maintenance but also to ensure that the welfare system identifies them
as early as possible and then helps them attain access to a coordinated
and sustained array of services.
Meanwhile, as the first section of this paper has suggested, a review
of the negative income tax experiments as a particular style of evaluation
with a particular approach to reform suggests that as policymakers em-
bark on new research efforts, they should try to trace out how their
investigations will relate to the systems they are intended to improve.
As noted previously, experiments cannot and should not be all cast in
one mold. However, in all cases it seems worthwhile for researchers to
devote attention to the problem of how, in view of the predictable con-
straints and gaps between the worlds of theoretical research and func-
tioning political systems, understanding and communication can be
maximized. Simplicity of research design and sharp framing of ques-
tions are important, as is the need to provide for good cross-site
analysis. Every effort should be made to convey research information
clearly and simply, and to disseminate it periodically, rather than only at
the end of the research study. With all of this, it remains a challenge to
design and conduct theoretical research that matters in the world of
public policy. Reviewing the negative income tax experiments has
offered an opportunity to assess the dimensions of this challenge.A PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR’S VIEW 241
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Wilbur I. Cohen*
Barbara Blum’s paper is excellent and clear. It credits the negative
income tax experiments with three specific administrative accounting
changes in the aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) and food
stamp welfare programs: monthly reporting, automatic processing, and
retrospective budgeting. She points out, however, that "the verdict is
still out on the ultimate usefulness" of these changes mandated by the
Reagan administration’s 1981 legislation. The negative income tax
experiments, therefore, cannot be said to have produced no results so
far. Social science research must always be thankful for even small
results in the short run. The results in the long run probably will depend
on how long the research community is willing to wait. I believe there
will be other results. The ultimate lessons of the experimentation, in my
opinion, are likely to result in incremental improvements in our welfare
programs over time rather than a single "quantum leap."
Ms. Blum’s paper indicates that the administrators of the negative
income tax experiments did not have a close working relationship with
state welfare administrators. I do not believe this was a fatal mistake.
Nevertheless, the results of the experiments have not been widely ex-
plained to state welfare personnel, and thus these results have not been
shared among those who might be able to put them to administrative
use or at least discuss them with their governors. But here again, I do
not believe this would have made any more difference than having
discussed the effect of the marital dissolution results with Senator
Moynihan. Despite the original endorsement of the negative income tax
*Professor of Public Affairs, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of
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by Milton Friedman in 1962, the basic idea has had no favorable impact
on the Reagan administration.
Ms. Blum’s paper contrasts these income maintenance experiments
and the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation’s experimen-
tation on "workfare," the Work Incentive (WIN) Program, or related
work and training projects. MDRC utilized welfare clients as the sub-
jects of its research, which involved a close relationship with state
welfare administrators. It has taken 25 years to develop work and train-
ing experiments with welfare clients since the idea was first put forward
in 1961-62 in the Community Work and Training Program. The results
from this research are not entirely favorable, but at least they have not
produced the negative results of the income maintenance experiments
with regard to reduction in hours worked, or suggested that such
payments contribute to marital dissolution. I venture to prophesy that
work and training experimentation will spread in the next decade;
economists should spend more of their energy in the design and evalua-
tion of the projects.
One area that seems to me to call out for research experimentation is
the appropriate "earnings disregard" for work income. The current
AFDC program’s $30 and one-third earnings disregard, which I
negotiated in 1967 (and which took me nearly seven years to obtain), has
been around for nearly 20 years and needs reexamination. Originally I
proposed $50 and 50 percent to the House Committee on Ways and
Means in 1967, then offered them $40 and 40 percent as a compromise.
They took $30 and one-third, on the grounds that further testing of the
appropriate formula was needed in terms of actual experience. Yet, as
far as I know, no extensive research has been done on this matter. Why?
The earnings disregard is such a fundamental element of any income
maintenance program. I would like to see the federal AFDC law give
states wide latitude to experiment with different earnings disregards.
A major difficulty with any income maintenance proposal is the
level of payment: if the proposal sets too high a payment for the person
with zero income and includes too high an earnings disregard, many
persons will receive payments at levels far above what others believe are
desirable or even financially feasible. It does not seem possible to make
provision for abolishing poverty as an income strategy and at the same
time include a significant income incentive for those persons who can or
want to work.
The fact of the matter is that a negative income tax consists of several
major elements:
1. A basic floor of income for persons with no earnings;
2. An earnings disregard, as an incentive to work;
3. Disregard of assets as a bar to receipt of payment;244 Wilbur J. Cohen
4. Simplified administration by nonprofessional personnel; and
5. A presumption that the plan will be administered on a nation-
wide basis by a non-welfare agency.
In my opinion, it would be possible to have different states put such
a plan into operation with different income, asset, and earnings
disregards. Senator Ribicoff advocated several such state experiments in
1970 at the time the Family Assistance Plan proposal failed in the Senate.
Until now no state, the federal government, or any economist has picked
up this challenge, however.
I think we should experiment with this and some other policies that
have been advocated for some time but have not been put into opera-
tion. They include:
1. Federal legislation requiring a program, in all states, which
would provide assistance payments under AFDC to the children
of needy unemployed parents, allowing states a wide latitude on
the definition of who is "unemployed," but with some minimum
federal definition of the term "unemployment."
2. A minimum federal floor of income support, set initially at about
65 percent of the poverty threshold with both AFDC income and
food stamp evaluation to be counted. This floor would rise 2 per-
cent each year for 10 years, to 85 percent of the poverty
threshold.
3. A large-scale work and training program for all welfare clients
who want to participate.
4. State experiments with earnings disregards.
5. A broadened Medicaid program that would include all needy
individuals with incomes below the poverty line and thus divorce
income determination for Medicaid from the AFDC program.
6. Federal and state funds for evaluation of these policies.
7. A federal advisory council to report to Congress periodically on
the policies and research and to make recommendations on
them.
I believe we could have these policies in full effect by 1995. We could
then take another look at where we could and should go from there.